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ABSTRACT: The world economy is undergoing dramatic changes, largely driven by the
new availability of fine-grained information. Innovative ways of using data—large
and small—have also prompted a rethinking of the boundaries for the combination and
use of knowledge. The strategic design of information flows in the economy has the
upside of higher economic rents and competitive advantage, as well as the downsides
of wealth inequality and abuse of power. This has brought a wide range of regulatory
challenges. To understand the nature of these sweeping changes, it is important to
examine the new ways information is used, and how information flows can be
leveraged to create competitive advantage and dampen competition. The analysis in
this article examines four economic entities that produce and consume value, as well
as three determinants for the modes of their operations. The economic entities include
consumers, producers, markets, and society, whose interactions are determined by
viability, networks, and agency. In this framework, we paint a picture of the transfor-
mation of information-based strategy in the future and suggest promising research
opportunities.
KEY WORDS AND PHRASES: consumers, economic theory, hyperdifferentiation, infor-
mation flows, information politics, information strategy, intelligent assets, markets,
producers, society transformation.
Information Abundance Leads to Active Information Design
Information is a key ingredient in most human activities, and its systematic collec-
tion and management is of strategic interest in all imaginable economic and social
interactions [5]. The term strategic is used with respect to information typically to
indicate some form of payoff relevance [106], especially when the information
diminishes the uncertainty an agent (or an organizational decision maker) has
about states of the world that matter for performance [94, 110]. Since information
is generated, collected, processed, transmitted, and consumed over extended periods
of time, the strategic design of an information source amounts to creating dynamic
flows of information so as to influence the payoffs of those who set out to take
advantage of them. Over the past 70 years, research on information-based strategy
has focused on determining the impact information may have on decisions by
individuals, teams, and organizations [78, 107], the value of information related to
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the observed outcomes [46], and how information asymmetries may affect decision
makers’ and organizations’ abilities to interpret and respond to each other’s per-
ceived actions using appropriate mechanisms [139]. From the mosaic of past
analyses, patterns have emerged that can be recognized and used as templates for
effective strategy development and decision support [32, 37, 38].
By and large, the impact of information on managerial decisions is well-understood:
symbolically speaking we therefore know ∂(Decision)/∂(Information), which represents
the sensitivity of optimal decisions to information [18, 90]. However, when estimating
the impact of information on optimal payoffs by computing the total derivative,
dðPayoff Þ
dðInformationÞ ¼
@ðPayoff Þ
@ðDecisionÞ 
@ðDecisionÞ
@ðInformationÞ þ
@ðPayoff Þ
@ðInformationÞ
¼ @ðPayoff Þ
@ðInformationÞ ; (1)
it turns out that this sensitivity is (locally) irrelevant.1 This is because ∂(Payoff)/
∂(Decision) must be zero at an optimal decision due to Fermat’s rule in optimization
[10].Moreover, rather than thinking of information as a parameter that changes decisions,
one can think of it as a decision variable itself. The future of information-based strategy in
an information-rich world will depend on the design of information. In other words,
information flows can be actively used to attain a payoff maximum, at which the total
derivative in Equation (1) vanishes. We believe that an abundance of data, in conjunction
with changing boundary conditions in the economy, makes information a centrally
important decision variable and thus the design of information flows is a major theme
of future research in information-based strategy in organizations and society as a whole.
In what follows, we discuss how important trends are likely to affect four entities
of action—producers, consumers, markets, and society [89]—whose interactions
depend on the viability of all entities, the structure and capabilities of the multi-
layered network of connections they belong to, and the attainable agency-based
agreements they are able to forge for the allocation of tasks and resources among
themselves. Figure 1 provides an overview. The three determinants respond to three
Figure 1. Entities of Economic Activity and the Determinants of Interaction
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questions, namely, why? (viability), how? (network), and what? (agency) that define
the entities’ economic interactions. For each of the seven areas (consisting of four
entities and three determinants), we identify important areas of investigation, and
relate those to established research streams, recent cutting-edge work, as well as
leading indicators and our own best judgment, as a way to gauge the transformation
of information strategy in modern economies and society.
Producers: From Push Production to Large-Scale Customization
The Fourth Manufacturing Revolution
After the steam engine, Ford’s mass production, and the first wave of automation in
the 1970s, productivity increases have been decreasing rapidly in the new
millennium.2 The collective push production by globalized firms into large ware-
houses has led to excessive transportation and supply-chain rigidities. In addition,
labor costs have increased, slowly eroding economic advantages from centralized
global production. A fourth manufacturing revolution, sometimes called “Industry
4.0” [80, 85], driven by a combination of networked information technologies with
intelligent manufacturing robots, will have a profound impact on productivity and on
the economically feasible levels of product differentiation. The fourth manufacturing
revolution is a result of the fusion of information technology and other real-world
technologies in so-called cyberphysical systems. Besides implying a plethora of
technical system-integration issues when adapting algorithms to take into account
time delays, system heterogeneities, stability, and other hardware-related complex-
ities [47], there are broader strategic implications. First, intelligent robots will
increase the level of automation from currently less than 10 percent of all tasks to
more than half of them, including many nonrepetitive ones [93, 105]. At this level of
networked automation, differentiated and highly customized goods can be produced
at close to the same cost as mass-produced widgets, thus providing a green light for
the economic feasibility of mass customization in the domain of durable goods [84].
Second, the transformation of push production into pull manufacturing will make it
efficient to relocate factories to where the demand is, transforming global into
regional trade flows. This implies a new wave of reshoring and insourcing [62], at
least partially reversing the global outsourcing trend of the past few decades.
The fourth manufacturing revolution is just the tip of the iceberg: while especially
high in manufacturing (60 percent), the automation potential is indeed very signifi-
cant across the entire spectrum of economic activities, ranging from 27 percent in
educational services to over 70 percent in accommodation and food services [105],
pushing the cyberphysical frontier into most economic activities.
With the dissolving trade-off between cost efficiency and responsiveness, an
undisputed tenet in current operations management textbooks (see, e.g., Chopra
and Meindl [30]), interesting research topics will concern how to best translate
articulated customer preferences into customized products, how to adapt product
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design in modular ways to the new mode of manufacturing,3 and how to best
generate value from the individualized product designs. An important feature is
the close-to-real-time connection of demand to supply, with the Internet of
Things (IoT) [66] being linked to the Internet of Services, making use of smart
factories and smart products, among the many “newly intelligent assets” surrounding
us—including smart buildings, smart grids, and smart mobility. At such a high
level of sensing and processing, the design of the relevant flows of information
becomes key.
Precise Consumer Tracking
New technologies, including mobile phones, IoT sensors, and the Internet make it
possible now to track people in urban settings at many different levels [86]. These
may include the digital traces of their social networks with personal profile and
friends, geospatial and geotemporal data, their online site visits and purchase
behavior, their IP-address connections, card-based spending habits, and so forth
[48]. Companies need to understand how to combine various information sources
to obtain a high-resolution image of their consumers’ revealed preferences, which
has hitherto been private information (e.g., their incomes and purchasing patterns)—
with the result that information changes consumer behavior, and consumer behavior
in turn changes corporate strategy [31]. Consumer-level data can be used to predict
future purchase behavior and feed individualized hedonic valuation models to price
new products. This big-data approach to design is set to create a better fit for
customers with discoverable characteristics [29, 87]; yet the flip side of the coin is
that firms also derive better and more precise levers for price discrimination, and
thus can extract extra surplus from consumers, potentially more than offsetting the
benefits of a better fit [16]. The regulation of such tracking is complicated because it
is not easy to monitor the data processed inside a company, the effects of biases that
may be inbuilt in algorithms, and the data that these algorithms are fed with.
Individualized Pricing
With hyperdifferentiated products in the market [35], enabled by intelligent manu-
facturing and precise consumer tracking, companies will try to approximate first-
degree price discrimination by creating a “segment of one” [157], in other words:
total customization [149]. We should thus expect to witness a transition from
second-degree price discrimination (based on unobservable customer characteristics
and self-selection) to third-degree price discrimination (based on observable or
inferable customer characteristics) to an approximation of first-degree price discri-
mination. Because pricing does not happen in isolation, a firm’s ability to extract a
consumer’s surplus is normally limited by the consumer’s outside options [41, 128]
and by its own ability to create meaningful and distinguishable versions of a product.
As a countervailing trend to selling customized goods, there is a paradigm shift in
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consumers’ minds away from owning goods to accessing them when they are
needed to obtain value [14, 15]. And if goods are shared by many, they cannot be
too customized. Hyperdifferentiation is therefore limited by a propensity for sharing,
and firms will have to design this trade-off to their benefit.
Aftermarket Control
Manufacturers and sellers of technological goods have been trying to exert control
on both the primary and secondary product markets, for example, by using compat-
ibility and technological complements. Proprietary systems with limited interoper-
ability serve as mechanisms to lock in consumers [2, 61]. Firms can also tie the sale
of their products to consumers’ buying of other products [27]. In this vein, sufficient
sensing and networking intelligence embedded in devices enable firms to retain
increasing levels of control over how exactly their devices are used after they have
been sold. This will allow for the firm-consumer relationship to last and to adapt
with unfolding use patterns, for instance, for the collaborative consumption of
durables [153], including possibly the dynamic adjustment of product characteristics
and add-on prices. The complex issue of how to economically design and exploit
product control, subject to technological feasibility and available information, is an
important direction for future study.
Consumers: From Ownership to Access
The Rise of the Sharing Economy
The past decade has seen the emergence of sharing markets in many domains. They
allow consumers to adjust their consumption to their actual needs, and increase the
economic usefulness of their assets [15, 143]. In addition, depending on their pro-
jected future needs for an item, they can forgo the purchase of a durable and gain future
access via a sharing market, either from a peer or an intermediary that aggregates the
demand and supply for currently unused products. Numerous research topics are
related to this change in consumption behavior and its limits, as well as the implication
this has for firms’ product-design and pricing incentives [124, 152]. For example, with
collaborative use in the aftermarket, the seller of a shareable good can increase the
price by a sharing premium. In other words, the market value of shareable goods is set
to rise, if the market imperfections, for example, through search and coordination in
the peer-to-peer aftermarket, as well as the risk associated with sharing-related
transactions, can be kept sufficiently low [151].
Shaping and Participating in Information Flows
Consumers now have access to many different sources of information. Just as easily
as they can consume information, they can also become a source of information to
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which others can subscribe and the content of which others can collectively filter,
authenticate, and verify. How do individuals cope with this extent of information
overload? How can they effectively participate in a marketplace that is subject to
such heavy information flow, such as a stream of product reviews with daily
updates? The design of information flows is therefore multisided: as a source of
information, an agent chooses the format of a message, within the design confines of
a platform where the message will be visible; finally, a consumer of information sets
filters and opts in and out of certain content, so as to design an individualized stream
of information that warrants attention. As Herbert Simon [134, pp. 40–41] noted, “in
an information-rich world, . . . a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention
and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the over-abundance of
information sources that might consume it.” Future research needs to take into
account self-interested behavior, namely, that the wealth of (likely biased) informa-
tion is likely to produce a “richness in filters,” the quality of which modulates an
individual’s rational attention—a new form of infomediation, first described by
Hagel and Rayport [77] at the beginning of the dot-com era. Regulatory challenges
related to various targeted information streams such as advertising and fake news are
discussed in the section on society below.
New Approach to Learning
With the increasing obsolescence of products in many contemporary domains (e.g.,
smartphones and their apps, video cameras, computer technology and peripherals,
and many forms of online service offerings), consumers are likely to find themselves
feeling increasingly like “newbies” and relatively unfamiliar with many if not most
electronic products. The mounting system complexity and individuals’ increasing
scope of activities widen the impossibility of becoming an expert user. This, we
argue, requires a new scalable approach to learning, rather than the traditional
incremental acquisition of knowledge. It requires a mindset adapted for living with
complex systems that involve heterogeneous technologies [129].
Network Embeddedness
Consumers are participants in multiple networks. While each of these may provide
value and connectivity, the way they serve a consumer’s interest is likely to vary
widely, from social exchange, collaborative filtering (via recommendations of music,
books, movies, etc.), brand loyalty and shopping, alumni contact, charitable volun-
teership, and political representation. How does this influence their ability to auton-
omously act and transact? What are the relevant privacy perspectives? And what
does this mean for the trust consumers can place in others?
Network embeddedness will also bring new realizations to people about how to
achieve a more appropriate use of the products that they either purchase or hope to
have easy and cost-effective access to, or the on-demand services they need, which
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will change their purchase behavior. For example, when mobile phones are used to
digitally share a passenger’s pick-up location, the transaction cost for acquiring the
service drop and the price for the on-demand transportation service (e.g., Uber or
GrabTaxi) decrease. Furthermore, the penetration and availability of the service
increase, together with the utilization of cars. In related research by an automotive
analyst group at Deutsche Bank, it has been suggested that a move to transport-on-
demand may diminish the number of vehicles in service at any time, while reducing
the average service life of vehicles to about three years due to their greater service
loading of miles driven and hours used each day, and demand-smoothing to diminish
automobile sales cyclicality. As one may expect, not all observers agree with this
forecast, pointing to the effects of sharing as diminishing the durability and lifetime
distance for manufactured automobiles [130]—until automakers reassess their incen-
tives in the presence of car sharing and change their build quality so as to provide
more durability [124].
A further impact of network embeddedness and the resulting “thick” information
flows is the prima facie increase of customer informedness about goods, services,
and sellers, as well as an increase of firm informedness about consumers, customers,
and competitors, in addition to between-customer informedness about individual
preferences, opinions, and product/service recommendations [100]. As a second-
order effect, the relationships between consumers and firms change, and both sides
will use what they learn differently, as Clemons and Gao [34] noted a decade ago.
The difference today is that the level of informedness for all entities of economic
activity has led to faster markets, more responsive innovation on the supply-side,
and greater speed of induced shifts in consumer tastes and market trends. While on
the upside, more information tends to alleviate inefficient information asymmetries
(e.g., about product lifetime or repair costs because users can post such information
for all to see), it may also lead to a decrease in privacy [1, 136] and strategic
manipulation of information [45]. Future research will tease out the balance of these
countervailing effects for various product and service markets.
Markets: From Intermediated to Distributed Transactions
Endogenous Determinants for Intermediary Speed
While the analog world has not been able to exceed the speed of humans, a digital
world allows for faster links and transactions, which are limited by physical con-
straints rather than bounds on rationality. A case in point is the emergence of high-
frequency trading (HFT) practices in the equity markets in the 2000s [4], enabling
trade on surprise developments communicated around the Internet and via social
media, thus leading to rapid asset-price corrections [23]. Using dedicated telecom-
munication cables to communicate price and order information to and from an
electronic exchange, delays could be cut down to a very low latency in telecom
services terms [99]—resulting in what Steiner [138] has referred to as “Wall Street’s
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speed war.” Moallemi and Sağlam [113] estimate the cost of latency of trading on a
human time scale in the presence of high-speed execution by others, deriving
opportunity costs consistent with rents extracted by high-frequency traders. On the
one hand, HFT improves price discovery, while on the other it tends to selectively
remove liquidity from less attractive securities [22]. In the context of the adverse-
selection effect on liquidity, HFT has been called “Insider Trading 2.0,” with
markets exhibiting increasing volatility since the mid-2000s. Indeed, some observers
have pointed to a new irrationality and herding with overresponsiveness to mistaken
signals of value changes, leading to undesirable price swings and market-wide
impacts [21]. And yet the trading patterns of very active high-frequency traders
did not change when prices fell during the Flash Crash in 2012 [91]. Similar to other
“game-changing IT” that has captured firms’ rent-seeking interest over the years,
HFT has folded back into the “boring and unprofitable part of the basic infrastruc-
ture of markets” [158]. Future research needs to tease out whether beyond-human
execution speed is indeed desirable or if markets could benefit from rules that inhibit
technology races, such as the discretization of trading times (discussed, e.g., by
Stiglitz [140] and Haas and Zoican [76]).
An area where a self-interested financial institution may have an interest in
providing less than the greatest speed is electronic money transfer: banks have
been offering (almost collusively) slow settlement speeds that are nowhere close
to real time [75]. Indeed, a faster payment settlement has become a public policy
goal in a variety of countries around the world (e.g., the UK, Denmark, Singapore,
and Australia, among others) so as to achieve greater immediacy of transfers and
enhanced fairness (e.g., among consumers, retailers, suppliers, and card intermedi-
aries) under the watchful eye of financial regulators [145]. The European Central
Bank, for example, has identified late 2017 and 2018 for the implementation of TIPS
(TARGET Instant Payments Settlement) for its pan-European payment system,
TARGET [59]. A possible alternative to bank-centered settlement systems, namely
programmable cryptocurrencies, is discussed below.
The emerging technology-driven opportunities in the financial sector (e.g., in
payments, wealth management, credit cards, trade finance, remittances, investing,
and financial research [150]) are often referred to as being in the fintech domain of
technological innovation. Fintech leads to revised expectations for the performance
of customer acquisition, data-driven analytics, customer segmentation, and harmo-
nization for possibly shared infrastructure investments [49]. It also implies new
research directions to better design information flows and ingeniously derive infor-
mation-based strategy.
Programmable Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology
Historically, transaction costs imposed by banks are a result of their seeking rents
[146], and the same holds true for intermediaries’ commissions. Both are instances
of endogenous inefficiencies created by middlemen. In a programmable world where
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currencies need not be guaranteed by institutions but are rather based on collectively
accepted cryptographic protocols, a middleman’s speed limit need no longer affect
the transacting parties. When cryptography can ensure payments conditional on the
parties’ agreements, then the need for intermediaries (as guarantors and aggregators
of trust) subsides. There are many research topics in a new world of direct peer-to-
peer transactions, and intermediaries’ creative reactions to maintain a regime that
provides for their economic viability.
A spate of recent research on applications and their economic feasibility in this
area came as a result of digital cryptography innovations associated with Bitcoin
[116]. The underlying technology, blockchain, is a technical approach to prohibit the
replication of digital tokens, so digital money derived from these tokens cannot be
spent more than once. The essence of the solution, a distributed ledger system, was
described in a recent article published in Communications of the ACM, as follows:
“When a user wants to add a transaction to the ledger, the transaction data is
encrypted and verified by other computers on the network using cryptographic
algorithms. If there is consensus among the majority of computers that the transac-
tion is valid, a new block of data is added to the chain and shared by all on the
network. Transactions are secure, trusted, auditable, and immutable. They also avoid
the need for copious, often duplicate, documentation, third-party intervention, and
remediation” [147, p. 15]. This approach has made it possible to encode a dramatic
amount of new information using blockchain: for payments and foreign exchange
transactions, smart contracts, general ledger updates, and securities settlement [79].
There are also many applications that go beyond financial services, such as auto-
mobile registration histories [44], the provenance of fine art [25], and electronic
travel services [70].
At present, Bitcoin and blockchain are both regarded with a blend of skepticism
and anticipation by large commercial banks and regulators [81, 112]. Some describe
it as an inevitable pathway for innovation in payments and related financial services.
For example, Arthur Levitt Jr., ex-chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, argued that Bitcoin can enhance global financial inclusion, alleviate
the network scaling, computational speed, and “last mile” cost concerns of Bitcoin
FX conversion, and provide increasing resilience in the face of past Bitcoin
exchange failures such as Mt. Gox [97, 98]. Research will envisage and analyze a
world without intermediaries and explore what shifts this may imply for financial
intermediaries’ rent-seeking opportunities and the future of middlemen more gen-
erally, across electronic markets.
Trust Protocols
As a by-product of the cryptographic advances that enable programmable currencies,
it is possible to ameliorate informational asymmetries via digital protocols. Evidence
of information availability can be given without transmitting any part of the infor-
mation using zero-knowledge proofs, thus breaking Arrow’s paradox of information
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value [9], which highlighted a fundamental problem of charging for information
without disclosing it, thus possibly ruling out a market-based solution to patent
protection. At issue is whether there can be appropriate incentives for producers of
innovation that becomes a public good (as is usually the case with new technologies)
to allocate a socially optimal amount of resources to pursue innovation in the first
place. Livak [101] argues against all patent-related technological information being
treated as exclusive, and questions whether instead some of it can be commoditized
for widespread use, similar to Volvo’s decision in the late 1950s to give away its
patent on the three-point automobile safety belt. With new technologies such as
blockchain, it now may be possible to go beyond the patent system by encoding
instances of technology innovation-related patent information for which commodi-
tized versions can be shared, including instructions for implementation that can be
tracked as a basis for identifying market transactions. Thus, in contrast to the widely
held view that patents create incentives that tend to protect technological informa-
tion, blockchain offers a countervailing basis for their commoditization and metering
of the related transactions.
The extension and design of new protocols for the release of information in
business, government, and social settings will be a fruitful area of research that
has immediate economic relevance. Many observers, including the tech-savvy mar-
ket research firm International Data Corporation (IDC), have pointed to the impor-
tance of the digital platform transformation in business and government
organizations. They recognize a progression from mainframes and centralized com-
puting (the first platform, via less centralized client-server computing (the second
platform), to the cloud of Internet computing capabilities combined with wireless
devices, smart products, IoT sensors (the third platform) [144]. It is here that we
expect to observe substantial contributions and intersection of research activity
involving information systems, computer science, and economics.
Micropayments
The ability to monetize small transactions can have a profound impact in the
aggregate. For example, by charging very small amounts for e-mail transmissions,
untargeted spam messages may be curtailed [6, 148]. Similarly, micropayments
could incentivize aggregate behavior such as for energy savings, thus helping with
matching demand for electricity with its intermittent supply. For example, the Swiss
Ethereum Foundation’s (www.ethereum.org) blockchain-encoded unit of exchange
(Elethron) involves transferrable digital credit tokens for the sale of energy from a
power company to the electricity grid used by consumers and organizations, or for
the end users to sell power back to the grid [52].
And yet, it has long been recognized that micropayments may not be the best
instrument for payment when the good or service is one for which usage-based fees
are not appropriate [115]. For example, is a monthly flat connection fee for the
opportunity to do as many searches on the Internet as desired, at zero marginal cost,
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or a per-search fee more appropriate? The answer may be a matter of degree: for a
sufficiently small per-search fee, marginal cost is inconsequential enough to almost
disappear from consideration, yet still perhaps tends to reduce procrastination (see,
e.g., Andreou and White [7] for an overview). These issues, including a crossover to
behavioral economics, suggest interesting avenues for research on electronic markets
for durables and commodities such as energy or advertising that transcend disci-
plinary boundaries.
Trading of Externalities
Information flows about individuals’ activities can provide important feedback about
actions (externalities) that influence the payoffs of others. For example, air and water
pollution, and other damage to the environment may be perceived as a consequence of
ineffective management of negative externalities such as excess carbon dioxide. Prices
for such externalities can help, for example, in the form of a carbon tax or the cost of
emissions permits in a cap-and-trade market. The design of such markets can even
include secondary objectives such as providing incentives for investing in innovation
[154]. Beyond environmental externalities, there are other equally pervasive payoff
interconnections, for example, related to congestion. But would it make sense to use
peak-load pricing for train tickets to manage congestion? Canwe usemicropayments and
real-time bidding to improve social welfare by switching traffic lights to favor the queue
with the highest bids? The underlying logic is provided by the seminal Coase theorem
[39], which ensures the attainability of Pareto-optimal (i.e., economically efficient) out-
comes in situations without information asymmetry as long as property rights are
allocated.4 Future research will focus on how to use our information-rich environment
and intelligent regulation to ensure clearly defined property rights, together with a smart
dynamic market design so as to implement efficient outcomes in real time.
Society: From Allocative Efficiency to Fair Sustainability
Social Context
Modern IT is dramatically changing business and society. While in aggregate these
changes tend to be positive, the benefits of technology applications tend to be
distributed unevenly. And, as with any disruption, there are likely to be winners
and losers.
As with previous technologies associated with mass production of textiles and
heavy industry, there have been both a great creation of wealth and a substantial
surge in unemployed or underemployed workers. Recent technological innovations
have intensified income inequality [120], in part due to the winner-take-all [63]
character of many online business models [24]. There may be additional unforeseen
impacts, where wealth disparity and income inequality are further exacerbated, and
although society might benefit as a whole, some sectors of the labor market and
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some segments of the production economy can be significantly worse off, perhaps
for extended periods of time.
There also may be unforeseen risks associated with the winner-take-all nature of
some businesses, reinforced by economies of scale and network effects, where the
first established player may have the power to eliminate competition and stifle
innovation. And there may be unforeseen risks associated with firms that gain
dominance in one industry or one market segment, and then use that power to
dominate other areas, again potentially limiting competition and stifling innovation
[33]. There may even be areas in which many users gain, but some participants are
hurt due to externalities, possibly outweighing the gains [104]. Some of the key
questions include:
● What are robust objectives for social welfare? What are appropriate metrics?
● How should social and regulatory policies be designed? More specifically,
how would one describe the greatest good that could be produced by a
transformative innovation and how would one know if it had been achieved?
● Howwould one regulate innovative emerging businesses to achieve the greatest
good? How would one measure behavioral improvement? What regulation is
likely to yield improvements in the chosen social-welfare objectives?
● How would one regulate so as to not increase the harm or limit the benefits
from innovation? This could happen through premature or inappropriate
regulation that reduces competition or stifles innovation, for example.
To address those questions effectively, a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods
is appropriate, from both an empirical and a theoretical viewpoint, as the answers
will contain descriptive, normative, as well as prescriptive elements.
Democratization by Access
What once took a professional audio studio to master, anybody can now record at
home. The radical change in affordable recording technology and the possibility
for self-publishing music is symptomatic of the democratization that follows from
access to hitherto unaffordable assets and technological progress [19]. A profes-
sional film camera can be rented, access to a sports car obtained on a sharing
market, and a yacht consumed collaboratively while the owner is on vacation. The
effects of income inequalities, for example, to curtail consumption for some, are
attenuated by the possibility of temporary access to products, creating a win-win
for the effective use of available resources. This implies a thicker tail for the scope
of consumers’ demand interests and product offerings in the market. Research will
explore the effects of access democratization and resulting new pricing and
differentiation of products that may restore partial inequalities if it is possible to
effectively segment the market so consumers with a higher ability to pay also pay
more.
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Widening Human Reach and Newly-Binding Constraints
The changes in human abilities due to augmented reality, advanced materials,
genetic manipulation, and self-healing abilities will have a profound impact on
society. All of these dimensions of transformation depend heavily on information-
processing capabilities. And the (perhaps merely virtual) gains need to be matched to
the allocative realities of a finite globe.
Since the earth’s steady-state carrying capacity [40] is being overconsumed by a
large multiple, it is inevitable that natural-resource constraints will become binding
at many levels in the not so distant future [67]. This imposes a closed-loop
perspective on the use of resources, including durables, consumables, and services,
resulting in numerous new flows of material, information, and income [156].
Intelligence embedded in assets can help provide information feedback for producers
and consumers [53].
Regulatory Challenges
Our intuition suggests that it would be quite surprising if the rapid domination of the
market by a dozen fairly young companies did not create unanticipated side effects,
much as the domination of a few railroads, a single oil company, a single steel
company, and a single telecommunications company did a century ago. Ubiquitous
information flows have side effects, which in turn create regulatory challenges, the
heterogeneity of which is illustrated by the following three examples.
Targeted advertising, differential pricing, and “free” services. Why would ser-
vices subsidized by targeted advertising be a problem? Why should targeted adver-
tising be any different from standard broadcast advertising? Why should value-
adding strategies based on providing free services, funded by cross-subsidies from
advertising revenues, be any different from one-stop shopping at a really good
supermarket, mega-market, or hypermarché? Moreover, nothing in existing regula-
tion appears to deal with the delayed and hidden harm from privacy violations. Our
online activities allow service providers to create a detailed and accurate profile of
our preferences, our habits, our desires, our willingness to pay for goods and
services, the risks we face, and the costs to serve us. The current benefits from
our activities are clear. The future downsides are both uncertain and not yet visible.
The most extreme may be first-degree price discrimination in essential services
[133], or in health care if the Affordable Care Act of 2010 is repealed in the
United States.
Reallocation of scarce resources and society’s perceptions of fairness. Uber and
Airbnb are simply the harbingers of sharing platforms that may lead to the market-
ization of everything, with a market-clearing price that allocates everything to the
individuals most willing to pay for it. This may be socially acceptable for taxis at
rush hour under surge pricing. Yet this may not be acceptable for organ transplants.
Many other goods and services are in a gray zone, and in need of a societal vision of
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fairness against which to measure the need for allocative efficiency. For instance,
Airbnb provides clear benefits both to people who want to earn a little extra money
by offering their homes as accommodations to renters, and to short-term renters who
want to obtain housing but do not want to stay in traditional hotels. Without
platforms such as Airbnb though, the sharing economy would be impossible.
Other cities are concerned that long-term tenants might be forced out of their
apartments and entire regions of the city might become de facto hotels, reducing
the available residential housing market while providing unfair competition to
existing hotels. Some tenants are concerned that mixing short-term renters with
long-term residents may significantly alter the character of their homes. How should
these concerns be balanced? Markets alone do not address the problems created by
externalities; by definition, they are outside the scope of market forces.
Manipulation of public opinion via search and fake news. Nothing in existing
regulation appears to address the problems of intentional search bias and the
potential for manipulation of public opinion. Recent studies have demonstrated
that search-engine bias can be used to manipulate public opinion before elections
and referenda occur [56, 57]. There is no Federal Search Commission to ensure
fairness, much the way the Federal Communications Commission used to ensure
fairness when there were a small number of TV stations, and bias could indeed affect
the electorate’s access to information. With search now far more concentrated than
media, and with search bias much harder to detect than media bias, is it necessary to
enforce some form of fairness in search? How could that be defined or implemen-
ted? Could that indeed include a Federal Search Commission [20]? Even more
directly affecting public opinion than biased search results is the surge of unverified,
so-called fake news, which appears to not be addressed at all in existing regulation.
First Amendment rights allow for freedom of speech, subject to few restrictions. But
fake news on social media can reach millions very quickly and is therefore materi-
ally different from private speech. For instance, the impact of fake news on the
Brexit Referendum is becoming clear [72, 135]. And yet the impact of fake news on
the 2016 U.S. presidential election may never be fully revealed [118]. Moreover,
fake news is emerging as a potential issue in upcoming elections throughout the
European Union.
Toward Closed-Loop Public Policy
Public policy can set important boundary conditions for individuals’ decisions. For
example, investment decisions in low-emissions technologies are driven by expecta-
tions of a sufficiently high price of emissions, which can be imposed by a regulator
using various instruments such as taxes or emissions permits. The information for
defining such policies and making them effective is often not available at the point
when the policies are defined. They therefore need to be made conditional on
relevant indicators in the future. For example, an emissions tax may be made
contingent on economic activity or on the results of controlled pollution
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measurements. Generally speaking, policymakers need to think in terms of closed-
loop information-based policies. The path of the policies will then depend on the
realizations of the contingencies specified in the public plan.
Viability: Ensuring Economic Survival of the Self
Survival Principles
Viability concerns the successful survival of an economic entity. Because of increas-
ing resource scarcity, existing consumer demands, and mounting competitive pres-
sures between firms and market operators, concerns for economic viability will only
go up. And if the survival of an entity is at stake, there may be little room for error,
so that the objective of surviving is fundamentally different from simply maximizing
expected payoffs in a regime of going concern. To deal with the existential aspects
of survival, there are two extreme perspectives. First, there is a robust approach,
relevant for consumers and small firms for whom the loss of viability is difficult to
recover from. By maximizing value when a worst-case situation occurs, it may be
possible to guarantee survival independent of the payoff distribution.5 Yet the
resulting strategy is likely to be rather conservative, leading to a loss of competitive
edge, and further damaging viability in a society where others act less cautiously.
The second approach concerns jointly held economic entities such as firms or other
organizations that are protected by limited liability. The latter implies convex payoffs
near bankruptcy and therefore a risk-seeking attitude, as investor-owned firms are
usually gambling with other people’s money [60].6 Between these two extreme
approaches, each operating in isolation, evolutionary principles may serve as a
guide for the behavioral and strategic maxims that would increase the chance of
successful economic survival in a hyperconnected world [125, 126]. We specialize
these to redundancy, modularity, and adaptation, which—although not exactly
orthogonal—provide three useful axes for discussion.
An economic entity’s resilience is implied by the confidence it has in its manage-
ment of unforeseen contingencies and risks [132]. It is in part created by redundancy
and the flexibility from modularity, but it does have additional aspects. For example,
a resilient firm not only must have the ability to withstand shocks but also must
adapt to changing circumstances.
Redundancy
By maintaining relationships with more than one company for the redundant supply
of a key part or the provision of outsourced software (SaaS), infrastructure (IaaS), or
process-as-a-service (PaaS), a firm can ensure supply of business resources that are
critical in the production of its own goods. Services can be maintained even if the
counterparties they typically work with fail. Clemons et al. [36] pointed out that
beneficial redundancy can arise from a “move to the middle,” away from single-
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source suppliers in procurement, as suggested by selection of the lowest-price
suppliers of requisite quality, as opposed to maintaining many costly relationships
to coordinate when fewer will do. In a similar vein, Kauffman and Mohtadi [88]
apply transaction-cost theory to procurement with digital intermediation via plat-
forms that are proprietary or open. Inherent risks are due to the possibility of supply
failure including failure of a platform and the operating intermediaries. The authors
consider risks as part of transaction costs and explain the sensitivity of open versus
proprietary platforms to random performance shocks. It turns out that open supply
platforms tend to exhibit some degree of antifragility [141] as a result of the payoff
convexity created by the options embedded in the diversity of platform participants.
Modularity
By separating components, companies can facilitate the customization of products.
A modular design creates real-option value for future design modifications [11].
Modularity also simplifies aftermarket control and monetization. Such design can be
used as a basis for tracking asset components by firms, consumers, or the regulator.
Prior to the emergence of IoT solutions, and new ways to go beyond the limitations
of radio frequency identification (RFID), asset tracking was possible in the factory,
along the supply chain, and at the retailer’s or wholesaler’s premises [43]. Beyond
the pre-sale business process, however, there were few substantive technical solu-
tions available for automated tracking (with the exception of serial numbers, part
identifiers, and point-of-purchase information). Yet today, we see the emergence of
IoT sensors, digital proximity beacons, and embedded devices that support smart
tracking of products [108]. These capabilities create new ways for organizations to
achieve economic viability in their aftermarket business. Combined with analytics
from aftermarket service data, it may be possible for them to create new revenue
streams and enhance profitability.
Adaptation
The ability to adapt is a prerequisite for organizations to achieve and maintain
economic success. Effective adaptation can be attained using dynamic information-
based strategies. Naturally any opportunity to gain a supranormal profit in an
economy disappears over time, due to imitation, technological innovation, and the
drift of consumer preferences—be it natural or induced. The red-queen effect con-
nects evolutionary biology to the economic rat race [127]: an organism needs to
continually change so as to stay at the same relative level of competitiveness
regarding other species, because the other organisms in its ecological niche are
similarly evolving. The same holds true for competitive advantage; it disappears if
not continuously built and rebuilt in a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction
[131]. By contrast, the court-jester hypothesis suggests that other abiotic forces,
rather than competition between autonomous entities, may be responsible for driving
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adaptation. In our context, it is safe to say that a combination of the two holds true,
in the sense that innovation—even from noncompetitors or as a result of cultural
change—can destroy profit opportunities, and thus drive the adaptation of economic
entities as a matter of their survival. Consider, for example, the digital convergence
of technologies [160], which is not the direct product of competition but rather a
product of technological breakthroughs in different industries, together with a
demand pull by consumer tastes that ask for smaller devices with more functionality,
as well as for interoperable technologies.
Information Systems Applications
The emergence of natural-resource constraints and new levels of competitive pres-
sure, as initially posited, requires a rethinking of effective strategies that provide
good chances of survival for economic entities. Research in information systems
needs to tackle informational requirements for the implementation of such strategies
in dynamic environments with significant uncertainties (e.g., about technologies,
constraints, or agents’ preferences). It also needs to build a convincing ensemble of
cases, be they analytical or qualitative, which allow us to extract patterns of viable
information-based strategy, evaluated in terms of providing sufficient redundancy,
modularity, and adaptation.
Multilayered Networks: Topology of Business and Social Interactions
Connectedness
Network nodes often belong to multiple networks, both physical and informational.
A better understanding of this multilayered connectedness is needed, together with
an empirically tested theory of how decisions are made in such a collectivized
environment. For example, networks may have a social layer, a physical transaction
layer, and a financial transaction layer. In addition, there may be cooperative or
competitive relations among different agents and different modes of interactions.
Representations and analysis tools for such multiplex networks have become avail-
able only recently. To make good predictions about the behavior of real heteroge-
neous networks, researchers in information systems may adapt some of these
techniques, including representation, centrality measures, and spectral properties;
see Garas [64] for an overview. Related to the inherent multilayered complexity of
network structure, it is necessary to understand how interventions, and more gen-
erally diffusion processes, percolate through a network. This can help identify
network nodes where intervention would prove especially fruitful, in terms of the
expected results per expended effort.
For almost half a century, the Bass diffusion model [12] has been the gold
standard for explaining technological adoption processes in terms of simple
logistic growth curves, with excellent predictive performance [13]. Due to its
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aggregated formulation, the Bass diffusion model does not tend to capture well
the interesting diffusion dynamics that arise in the presence of systematic differ-
ences among node types in a network – such as consumers vs. firms, or in
different regions, such as city vs. rural locations. Some progress has been made
in implementing a Bass-type diffusion model on networks [17], or in deriving
Bass-type diffusion results in a setting with market frictions and strategic inter-
actions, for example, in the context of sharing markets [123]. It is important to
note that diffusion phenomena in networks tend to exhibit sharp phase transitions
(in terms of the link-formation probability) [102], which are similar in spirit to
the required presence of a critical consumer mass in fulfilled-expectations pro-
duct-diffusion models with network externalities [51]. Estimating the required
critical mass for the diffusion of key technologies is important for proper con-
ditioning of regulatory incentives [117].
Privacy
Connectedness and distributed sensing create a significant challenge for privacy. The
latter can be valued and perhaps protected using the micropayments and encryption
protocols discussed earlier under “Network Embeddedness” and “Micropayments.”
A secondary effect will be countermeasures by the concerned parties (e.g., consu-
mers) to disguise their identities and actions, in an effort to secure their transactions
and limit the outside’s awareness of their personal choices. Interesting future
research topics involve the balance between the preservation of privacy, the legit-
imate collection and use of information by self-interested organizations about others,
and the robust welfare objectives in a free society.
Social Networks
Managers in firms and consumers operate in social networks where their choices
are influenced by those to whom they are connected. As many social networks
now have an online presence, whether on social media networks such as Facebook
or Twitter, online forums such as Stack Overflow for programmers, or e-mail list
servers, researchers now have easy access to social networking information that
was extremely hard to come by before. This has allowed us to gain a much better
understanding of the role of social networks in marketing [159], adoption of new
technology [119], diffusion of innovation, performance of teams [58], production
of open source software [142], finance [122], and other economic activities. As
pointed out earlier, the social-network layer is set to become an integral part of
business transactions. This creates room for interesting theoretical and empirical
case studies. For example, Gunarathne et al. [74] consider customer-complaint
management on a social network and find, in the case of an airline, that interven-
tion and self-reported satisfaction varied significantly with its customers’ relative
influence in the network.
THE INFORMATION-BASED TRANSFORMATION OF STRATEGY AND SOCIETY 443
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
ing
ap
or
e M
an
ag
em
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
3:4
3 2
6 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
Network Structure
Ever since Granovetter [71] pointed out the importance of the whole network,
including the parts that are distant and close to any one node, researchers have
been looking not just at local node properties such as degree but at overall network
connectedness and centrality [83]. To actively make use of social-network properties
for economic analysis is not without its own challenges. An important example is a
possible endogenous connection between connectedness and homophily [95], mak-
ing it difficult to disentangle the effects of social-network connectivity from the
direct effects of similar demographics [8, 96]. As noted earlier, many of the
challenges for future research will stem from the necessity to take into account the
multilayered heterogeneous nature of the networks surrounding us, and from the
difficult questions about where to intervene or how to tailor the network topology to
achieve specific objectives.
Nonlocality of Intervention
To solve the “wickedly connected” problems in a networked world, borrowing the
words of John Seely Brown in his concluding keynote at the fiftieth anniversary of
the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), it is necessary to
think of global rather than local approaches. Problems are connected and they
generally change when people and organizations start to actively work on them.
So again, a much better understanding is needed of diffusion and percolation across
networks and networked feedback effects, so that we can begin to comprehend how
forward-looking and effective intervention in multilayered networks may be
designed.
Agency: Designing Nodal Interactions
Sourcing from a Networked Crowd
Peer pressure across networks may be used to motivate nodes to contribute to a task
or to comply with certain behavioral norms (e.g., paying back a crowd-financed loan
[65]). There are many interesting topics associated with trying to get a group of
people to generate an aggregate product or record, which may on the one hand
improve the efficiency of discovery and problem-solving [3] and on the other hand
also lead to more novel (although perhaps less feasible) ideas than those of tradi-
tional professionals [121]. From a more abstract viewpoint, the performance of a
network in aggregating information, for example, depends on its structure [69].
More generally, the observability of actions across social networks changes the
behavior of individuals. Research may contribute to a better understanding of
these issues, in particular it could inform how information technology can help
(e.g., via protocols) to create a regime of trust and thus become an at least imperfect
substitute for costly social interactions.7
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Transparency and Obfuscation
While prima facie interconnectedness would tend to promote transparency and
mutual awareness, it also provokes deliberate obfuscation activities. For example,
when assessing creditworthiness in a network, other nodes and reputation may be
helpful, but an individual may take countermeasures to obfuscate his or her
financial history. Beyond the simple evasion or hiding of disadvantageous infor-
mation, such endogenous obfuscation appears also in situations where it is
perhaps much less anticipated: on the part of firms and intermediaries. For
example, search intermediaries face a trade-off between revenue generated by
displaying sponsored links (which tend to reduce the usefulness of the search and
thus decrease participation), and providing transparent results to drive up parti-
cipation. Weber and Zheng [155] consider an intermediary that uses a weighted
average of bid amount and product quality as its ranking mechanism for spon-
sored links, and reveal that revenue is generally highest when a positive (but
never the full) weight is placed on quality. Ellison and Ellison [54] show that
retailers engage in practices of obfuscation, making the search of consumers
more difficult, thus decreasing consumers’ price sensitivity (see also Ellison
and Wolitzky [55]). The underlying motivation for obfuscation is rent-seeking,
of course [146]: an intermediary’s reason to exist is usually because it alleviates a
market imperfection, for example, by reducing search cost, improving matching,
or resolving moral hazard [137]. Yet, the intermediary also tries to appropriate as
much of the efficiency gain as possible, so that society tends to benefit much less
than it might seem at first.8 Future research needs to tease out the boundary
conditions under which endogenous obfuscation is limited or even eliminated.
This relates to the “world without intermediaries” that may be achievable using
programmable cryptocurrencies, discussed in the section on markets.
Connecting the Digital to the Physical
The analog and digital worlds are orthogonal to each other. A “narrative” often
serves a useful purpose to bring them together.9 For example, the gamification of
an augmented-reality view of a supermarket or a shopping street promotes the
users’ willingness to explore and follow sponsored cues [111]. To be useful for a
real-time decision market, the available designed flows of information need to be
able to seamlessly fit into the decision maker’s reality and familiar heuristics.
Human–computer interaction [26] has evolved over the past 40 years so as to
narrow the gap between the machine environment and the human task environ-
ment. To be usable, information-based strategy needs to be simple enough for
human decision makers, and it needs to be adapted to human heuristics, correcting
systematic decision biases in a prescriptive way. In other words, information-
systems research—however useful it may be at the theoretical level—should strive
for integration into human decision processes. (For an overview of the latter, see
Kleindorfer et al. [92].)
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Conclusions
Strategic Design of Information Flows
Information is the glue that binds economic activities together. It is increasingly
embedded in products, transaction protocols, and social interactions, which can be
both a blessing and a curse. Designing information flows is payoff-relevant and
therefore of strategic importance. Understanding this is critical as we shift from the
“Internet Economy” to the “Sharing Economy” and the “New Age of Smart
Machines.” Our central argument is that information flows are being designed by
every economic entity: consumers are both sources and sinks of multisided informa-
tion flows and can use filters to help them concentrate on subjectively relevant
pieces from an abundance of signals; producers collect large amounts of transaction-
based and third-party information about consumers that can be used for mass
customization, taking advantage of the next level of automatization in factories;
markets tend to aggregate information through price discovery [73]; and a networked
society acts as a moderating force because peer-to-peer information percolation is
difficult to control by self-interested parties, even the government. It is imperative
for a new generation of senior decision makers to reflect more deeply about the role
of active informational design in encouraging actions that ensure long-term organi-
zational viability, fairness, and societal improvement.
Managerial Implications
As we have argued throughout, an active management of information flows may be
important, but what exactly does this mean? What can decision makers do? And
how can research help? We discuss managerial implications for each of the three
determinants of interaction in our simple discussion framework (see Figure 1).
Viability. In the information-rich markets we envision, businesses without pro-
found design thinking applied to the information flows of concern in their market-
spaces are strategically vulnerable to competitors who engineer information for
competitive advantage and market power. Uncertainties and shocks in the economy
are so significant that substantial value fluctuations are affecting even a majority of
the top ten multinationals (in terms of market capitalization).10 Although a general
resurgence in the global economy likely played some role, each of these firms
experienced 12-month variations in equity value in excess of 25 percent between
mid-2016 and today. Firms need to have robust management practices, with suffi-
cient redundancy, adaptation, and modularity in their supply chains, so that they can
protect their balance sheets from operational risks, with negative realizations such as
Samsung’s recent battery failures in flagship consumer products or Volkswagen’s
2015 emissions mismeasurement scandal in some of its diesel vehicles. Acquiring
and reacting to customer feedback systematically can help to quickly fix issues
before they become major concerns, especially if the company disposes of redundant
suppliers and a modular product design. To adapt well to changing demands, the
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information collected from consumers needs to be effectively translated to design-
and production-relevant specifications.
Networks. The connectedness of consumers in multilayered networks with physi-
cal, informational, and financial flows makes it important for organizations to
understand how the effectiveness of their actions depends on the network structure,
and how influencing the structure can therefore change monetary payoffs and other
performance criteria, such as the environmental sustainability of its closed-loop
supply chain. An important aspect is that the Internet of Things can add products
—provided they are sufficiently smart—as nodes to the network, visible to the firm
and others. Products can be updated and monitored remotely, and their current use
status or failure likelihood may be known dynamically. Firms need to learn how to
use such information to their advantage and how to make consumers agree to let
their appliances transmit the information. In other words, subject to the prevailing
privacy regulation, information transfers from and to products need to be incentive-
compatible for consumers. That is, companies must design information flows and the
payoffs surrounding them so as to ensure a win-win scenario for themselves and
their consumers.
Agency. As noted in the main text, cryptographic protocols may have the power to
reduce the need for intermediaries as guarantors of trust. In the absence of complete
and instant verifiability, the transmission of information remains fundamentally
strategic, in the spirit of Crawford and Sobel’s [42] seminal contribution. As such
we have noted that endogenous obfuscation is part of any firm’s DNA in networked
markets; they may try to obfuscate their prices to change consumers’ price elasticity
and—in the case of intermediaries—they can withhold valuable information they
possess in order to appropriate the surplus their transactional innovation stands to
generate. Indeed, as Sophocles pointed out: “Truly, to tell lies is not honorable. But
when the truth entails tremendous ruin, to speak dishonorably is pardonable”
(Creusa).
Where Does the Future of Information-Based Strategy and Society
Begin?
The future of information-based strategy begins in the present, when firms can make
commitments to reconceptualize their information-based capabilities, related to
customer and product data, their business partnerships, their markets (and after-
markets), and the industries within which they operate. When it comes to the design
of information flows by organizations for their own benefit and the market’s, it is
important that some aspects of the designs must be immediately able to gain traction
for supporting solutions. For some of the companies we noted above,10 they have
done well to enhance people’s mobility, transform their ability to acquire and share
information and content with one another, gain access to cloud computing solutions
while transforming the infrastructure of computing itself, go beyond physical stores
to identify the online sources of the best value for purchases, support global access
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to financial markets and innovative financial services, and to do so in any region of
the world, in any language, and under any market conditions. Beyond design for the
present markets, of even greater importance relative to the long-term value of firm
activities is the ability of senior executives who create strategy to “project them-
selves and their organization[s] into the future, creating a path from where they are
now to where they want to be some years in the future” [103, p. 87]. So then,
information design for future competition must be viewed in terms of real options
[50]: adding to the information infrastructure of the present will create value for
future innovation, connectivity, execution, and—finally—for value creation itself.
We advocate experimenting with experimentation!
Changes at the societal level result from the aggregation of many different kinds of
efforts that underlie the primary changes that we observe. Very often such changes result
from the application of new venture capital, along with the redirected efforts of large and
long-standing competitors that, in aggregate, make changes in the way that processes are
architected, markets are operated, and rents are charged. This leads to differences that
sometimes require oversight, as some of the new technology-based capabilities result in
perceived unfairness and a shifting balance of individual rights to privacy. This has been
the case, for example, with the haphazard disclosure of personally-identifying informa-
tion, unsuspected uses of private information, and many forms of network penetration
by hackers with nefarious motives for profit from identity theft. The perceived transfor-
mation, expectations of future gains, and the emergence of unexpected (or expected)
problems are also likely to attract the interest of entrepreneurs, citizen groups, regulators,
governments and journalists. The economic changes will become real when they show
up in the performance statistics of urban areas, regional economies, corporate sectors,
real estate values, and financial markets.
Acknowledgments: We are indebted to two individuals who have been instrumental in our
research activities concerning Strategy, Information, Technology, Economics, and Society
(SITES). The first is Ralph Sprague at the Shidler School of Business, University of
Hawaii, who for many decades was a co-chair for the Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences (HICSS), including its recent fiftieth anniversary. In 2017, our SITES
minitrack at HICSS celebrated its thirtieth year of continuous existence (with minor name
variations). The second much-appreciated individual is Vladimir Zwass, Editor-in-Chief of
this journal, who over the decades has been steadfast in offering us numerous opportunities in
special issues, to help JMIS authors develop innovative research on information-based strat-
egy. We also benefited from help with the preparation of the article from Emmy Ai-Phuong
Hoang at Singapore Management University, and from Ilona Ball at the Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL).
NOTES
1. This is the content of the well-known envelope theorem in economics (see, e.g., Mas-
Colell et al. [109, pp. 964–966]).
2. A decrease in productivity growth obtains also after adjustments to take into account
output reductions associated with the Great Economic Recession between 2007 and 2009 [28].
3. Additive manufacturing will reduce the number of parts (perhaps by a factor of 20),
simplifying and inherently modularizing product design.
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4. By contrast, in a situation with bilateral or multilateral asymmetric information, the
Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem [114] guarantees a generic ex post inefficiency of any possible
transaction mechanism.
5. Maximizing the worst-case outcome is not the only approach to robustness. For
example, Goel et al. [68] introduce a robust approach to fairness using a competitive ratio
(termed relative fairness, there), which could be viewed as a possible social goal for the
allocation of resources that leads to outcomes that are reasonable with respect to a large class
of reasonable social welfare function; see also our discussion on society.
6. The payoff convexity near bankruptcy in the presence of limited liability can be seen as
follows. Let π(X) be a firm’s profit, where π(·) is an increasing function of the real-valued
realizations x of the random variable X. Then max{0, π(x)} is a convex function in the
neighborhood of the point x0 where π(x0) = 0. For example, if π(x) = log(1 + x) for x in
(–1, 1), then max{0, π(x)} is equal to 0 for x in (–1, 0) and equal to log(1 + x) for x in [0,1).
Even though the firm is risk-averse for x > 0 because of its concave payoffs there, it is risk-
seeking for lotteries that take significant advantage of its limited liability. For example, a 50–
50 lottery with the possible outcomes of x1 = –0.5 and x2 = 0.5 yields an expected profit of
log(1.5) that is larger than the firm’s profit of the expected value of the lottery: π(0) (as 0 =
(0.5) x1 + (0.5) x2); so the firm would be happy to take on the lottery rather than the expected
value of x0 = 0 for sure because it is protected by limited liability and is therefore exposed
only to upside risk.
7. Using evidence from the New York City taxi industry, Jackson and Schneider [82] find
that social connections (e.g., within ethnic communities) may significantly reduce moral hazard.
8. For example, because a sharing intermediary charges a commission to the users, the
diffusion of sharing markets is slowed down, thus decreasing the attainable surplus in the
economy [123].
9. See, for example, Todd Richmond’s ideas on “emulsional worlds” at http://emulsional
world.com.
10. The companies are: Apple ($797.8 billion), Alphabet ($663.2 billion), Microsoft
($532.8 billion), Amazon.com ($453.6 billion), Facebook ($437.8 billion), J.P. Morgan
($309.4 billion), and Alibaba ($290.4 billion); based on data from May 8, 2017 in major
United States stock exchanges.
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